INTRODUCTION

1
A recent study about the impact on indigenous players from the launch of the 2 English Premier League (EPL) in 1992 indicated that there had been a major change 3 in the nationality of players playing in the EPL [1] . The study demonstrated that over 4 20 years of the competition (to 2011/12) there was a significant downturn in the 5 opportunities available for English players, i.e. those eligible to play international 6 football for England. This conclusion was based on total appearances made in the 7 EPL and the overall number of players in the league. One limitation identified within 8 the study was that, although the methodology was more in-depth than previous 9 studies of this nature, it did not take into account the quality of the appearance, i.e. which had the intention to protect playing opportunities for indigenous players, 14 particularly younger professionals. Previous authors [4, 5] argued that the 15 expectation from UEFA was that the legislative rule changes would act as a panacea 16 to increase the profile and value of young home-grown professionals. It was 17 anticipated that this raised profile would create a culture of development where elite 18 clubs increase their interest, investment and resource into internal talent development 19 programmes. The value of home-grown players, it was hoped, would increase due to 20 this intervention by Europe's governing organisation. There were, however, concerns 21 raised around this rule due to conflicts with European Union laws on the freedom of 22 movement [6] . [7] . The three year deal for the Prioritising player development and maximising commercial revenues may not 8 necessarily be symbiotic for different stakeholders. It could be argued that there is a 9 dichotomy that has been widened by the greater rewards and finances involved.
11
The expansion of the UEFA Champions League, arguably the world's 12 premier club competition, has resulted in advanced financial rewards and, in terms of 13 player development, also adds another layer to this debate. For players, the lure of outlined that only Spain (75) had more Champions League players than Brazil (68).
20
Germany was third (with 51), followed by France (37), Portugal (34), Italy (26),
21
Argentina (24) and Holland (22 suggest issues with player development are more pronounced in some countries.
10
Green [13] suggested that English professional clubs invest an estimated £40m 11 annually into their youth academy programmes. However, the residual impact on the 12 elite league is minimal for this investment. As Slot [14] highlighted, only a small The UEFA home-grown rule was phased in over three years, first major leagues, and has been in place in full for seven seasons (to 2014-15). As highlighted in a previous study [1] , the term 'home-grown' does not necessarily mean The key phrase in the ruling is 'regardless of nationality'. Cesc Fabregas Part of the problem in the English game found by previous research [1] quality is the responsibility of the host system, not the players migrating into it, was 6 a concluding point of their study. has been shifting across these levels of trade, from trading between nations close to 2 each other to trading across continents [19] . Some migration between countries is to 3 be associated with historical ties [23, 24] ; although in the modern era there are few 4 international boundaries when it comes to player transfers.
6
The overall objective of this study was to extend the analysis in the study by 7 Bullough and Mills [1] to look at the volume of the playing opportunity between 
18
METHOD
19
The study by Bullough and Mills [1] outlined that the nature of the analysis 20 in terms of player development had focussed more on the starting line-up, or the 21 squad, rather than performance related data. That study aimed to analyse player This study is an extension of that original work, both in terms of focus (pan-1 European) and detail (including minutes played and age). 
RESULTS
6
The overall playing data shows that the six nations included in the study 7 recorded the top six aggregated appearances and minutes played over the sixteen 8 year sample, although the difference between nations is significant. For example,
9
Spanish players made 50,095 more appearances and 3,368,754 more minutes on the 10 pitch than the sixth ranked nation, England (see Table 1 ). Furthermore, England, 
EFFICACY OF THE HOME-GROWN RULES
4
The introduction of the home-grown rule was designed to protect This suggests that, at a headline level, the rule has not increased (or protected) the 13 proportion of playing opportunities made by players from the six major European 14 leagues. However, the impact has been different depending on nationality, both in 15 terms of playing opportunities in the league in their own national association, and in 16 the other five major leagues. Figure 2 outlines Although the proportion of appearances made by indigenous players to the 7 six leagues reduced by 4 percentage points overall, this differs by nationality.
8
Comparing nationalities against themselves, and not accounting for age or minutes but recorded over 38,000 more appearances across all 6 leagues, Table 1 ). This is 2 discussed in more detail later. The effect of the home-grown rule for these six nations, specifically 10 regarding whether the rule is protecting or enhancing opportunities for home-grown 11 players, is outlined in two ways, first using the difference between the first year of 12 the home-grown rule with the most recent in Table 4 and second, using the mean 13 scores across the two periods (pre and post) -see Table 5 . When comparing the Although comparing the first and last season gives an idea of the direction of arguably provides a clearer picture of the impact, and can be seen in Table 5 . Table 5 indicates a failure of the home-grown rule to protect indigenous 9 opportunities in some nations, whereas in others the results are more positive. As the 10 rule is applied 'regardless of nationality', this is the major flaw which does not Table 6 comparing pre home-grown rules with Table 6 shows that the average amount of time spent on the pitch for each 18 appearance made has slightly decreased for all six countries since the rule change.
19
Combined with the proportion of minutes played decreasing for five of the six 20 countries (excluding Germany, see Table 5 ), the influx of non-indigenous players continues to impact upon the volume and the quality of the playing opportunity for The longevity analysis suggests that, based on the 16 season sample, English Republic interrupt the group in fifth), as presented in Table 9 . This suggests that 15 imported players from outside the six major nations are more likely to be recruited 16 and subsequently transferred/not used than their indigenous counterparts. The headline results across the six major European leagues suggest that the 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
20
The UEFA home-grown rule was designed to increase the profile and value 21 of young home-grown professionals, with the creation of a development culture 22 where interest, investment and resource into internal talent development programmes 23 increased. The value of home-grown players, it was hoped, would increase due to 24 this intervention by the governing organisation. being refused a work permit. However, as stated previously, the premier competition 10 in England is not controlled by the governing body, thus making this more difficult 11 to implement. Furthermore, as Table 9 shows, the countries producing the greatest 
